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AFFECT AND OVERCONFIDENCE: A LABORATORY INVESTIGATION
By
John Ifcher
Homa Zarghamee

(Forthcoming in the Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics)

Abstract
We conduct two incentivized random-assignment experiments to investigate whether
overconfidence is impacted by (1) incidental mild positive affect, or (2) incidental mild
negative affects—anger, fear, and sadness. We measure overconfidence using
overestimation of past quiz-performance and overestimation of past quiz-performance
compared to peers. The results of the first experiment indicate that the effect of positive
affect on both measures of overconfidence is positive and significant for male subjects.
While mood-inducement is equally successful for female subjects, their overconfidence is
unaffected by positive affect. These positive-affect results are robust to various
specification checks. In the second experiment, we find consistent evidence of neither
anger, fear, nor sadness’s effect on overconfidence; the lack of a result is attributable
either to a genuine lack of relationship between these affects and overconfidence or to
confounded mood-inducements. The effect of positive affect on overconfidence may help
explain the relationship between mood and speculative bubbles and between mood and
trading volume. Further, our results have implications for the effect of happiness on
overconfidence and the role of emotions in economic decision-making, in general.
Finally, we examine the neural evidence supported by our data.

Keywords: overconfidence, beliefs, positive affect, mood, emotions, laboratory,
experiment, anger, fear, sadness

Introduction
Beliefs are an important facet of standard utility theory. A systematic deviation from
standard economic theory about beliefs is overconfidence, defined as the
“overestimat[ion] of [one’s own] performance in tasks requiring ability, including the
precision of [one’s own] information” (DellaVigna 2009). Overconfidence has been
shown to be prevalent among the general public as well as investors, managers, and other
important economic actors often considered too experienced to be subject to behavioral
deviations from rational choice (Barber and Odean 2001). The overconfidence of various
economic agents—CEOs, investors, and employees—has been critical in explaining the
following phenomena: company underperformance, attractiveness of stock options to
employees, overtrading, and gender differences in competitiveness (Barber and Odean
2001; Croson and Gneezy 2009; Malmendier and Tate 2005; and Oyer and Schaefer
2005).
Given the far-reaching and significant implications of overconfidence, identifying
its determinants and whether it is subject to manipulation is important. A noteworthy
determinant of economic behavior that has been identified in psychological and economic
experiments is the decision maker’s affect (or mood). For example, anger and mild
positive affect (or good mood) have both been shown to significantly decrease perceived
risk, while fear and sadness have both been shown to increase it (Johnson and Tversky
1983; Lerner and Keltner 2001).
More suggestive of a relationship between affect and overconfidence are the
following findings. Both positive affect and sadness have been shown to improve self-
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evaluations (Jundt and Hinsz 2002; Lyubomirsky et al. 2005; and Silvia et al. 2006),
which suggests that both may increase overconfidence. Second, both positive affect and
sadness have been shown to improve task performance (Isen 2008), which suggests that
both may decrease overconfidence in favor of correctness. Finally, positive affect and
negative affect have been shown to impact financial corollaries of overconfidence, e.g.,
overtrading in a way that would suggest that positive affect would increase
overconfidence and sadness would reduce it (Saunders 1993; Hirshleifer and Shumway
2003; and Edmans et al. 2006). Because these suggestive findings do not all point to the
same qualitative relationship, and because past attempts at directly quantifying the
relationship between various affects and overconfidence have been less than conclusive
about the causal relationship, further research is necessary.
In Study 1, we conduct a laboratory experiment to identify the effect of mild
positive affect on overconfidence. After completing a monetarily incentivized set of
trivia and math questions, the control (treatment) group watches a neutral (positive)
affect-inducing film clip. Subjects then estimate their performance, both in absolute
terms and relative to other subjects and both with and without monetary incentives. We
find that positive affect increases overconfidence, thereby reducing earnings. Subgroup
analysis by gender reveals that this result is exclusively true for male subjects. Female
subjects exhibit better calibration than men, and their overconfidence is unaffected by
positive affect.
From this experiment, though, the effect of negative affect on overconfidence
cannot be determined: negative and positive affects do not necessarily have opposing
effects, and different negative affects—e.g. fear versus anger—often give rise to different
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behaviors, as shown above in the case of perceived risk (Isen 2007). So we conduct a
second experiment (Study 2) with one control group corresponding to neutral-affect and
three treatment groups, each corresponding to one of three negative affects (anger, fear,
or sadness). Affects are induced using the corresponding affect-inducing film clip; all
other aspects of the experimental design are identical to Study 1. We find that sadness
increases overconfidence among non-Asians. Neither fear nor anger significantly
increases overconfidence. This may be because mood-inducement in Study 2 is less
successful than in Study 1.

Literature Review: Overconfidence
Experimental and field evidence of overconfidence abounds. In a range of contexts,
decision makers’ own-estimated performance exceeds their actual performance, and their
estimated ranking among peers exceeds their actual ranking. 1 That people are not good
at estimating their performance on trivial topics—topics that are likely novel to them or
outside the realm of their expertise—is quite natural. More interesting, though, is that we
often tend to be biased toward over- and not under-estimation. Even more interesting is
that this tendency does not disappear with experience. Overconfidence has been
identified among clinical psychologists, physicians, nurses, investment bankers,
engineers, entrepreneurs, lawyers, negotiators, and managers (Barber and Odean 2001).
Further, Barberis and Thaler (2003) claim expertise actually exacerbates overconfidence.

1

Confidence-interval elicitation has also been used to measure overconfidence. Subjects are asked
questions, but instead of simply estimating performance, they give 90% confidence intervals for each
question. That these intervals are roughly 2 times tighter than they should be has been used as evidence of
overconfidence (Alpert and Raiffa 1982). Recently, this method has been called into question. It has been
shown that a good deal of measured overconfidence is simply a result of an aversion against broad-interval
responses (Cesarini et al. 2006). Elicitation procedures that do not depend on confidence intervals result in
lower estimates of overconfidence; importantly, they do not eliminate overconfidence.
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Indeed, many of the conditions faced by experts—e.g., abstractly defined goals, and
decisions that are low in frequency or produce noisy feedback—are exactly ones that
have been linked to biased and overconfident decision-making (Malmendier and Tate
2005).
Given the broad range of actors subject to overconfidence, it is perhaps no
surprise that it has been linked to important economic and financial phenomena.
Overconfidence is often appealed to in behavioral finance models (see Barberis and
Thaler (2003) for a review of overconfidence in behavioral finance). There is also
empirical evidence of overconfidence’s effect on economic decisions. Malmendier and
Tate (2005) show that overconfident CEOs make inferior corporate investments; they are,
among other things, overly sensitive to investment cash flows and prone to overpay for
mergers. 2 Oyer and Schaefer (2005) provide empirical evidence of employees’
overconfidence to explain firms’ use of stock options for compensation. 3
Of particular relevance to the current paper is research that links overconfidence
to economic phenomena—asset-price bubbles and overtrading—on which the effect of
positive affect has already been established. A large theoretical literature explains asset
price volatility using overconfidence (Daniel et al. 1998). Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)
model investors as being overconfident in the accuracy of their own information to help
2

This finding is robust to different measures of overconfidence. First, overconfident CEOs are identified
as those who hold on to private options longer than is rational. Second, overconfident CEOs are identified
using the occurrence in the press of words suggestive of the CEOs’ overconfidence.
3
Using data from roughly 2000 firms, the authors perform calibrations of three competing models that seek
to explain firms’ use of stock options. The first model is incentive-based, with employees increasing their
productivity so that the firm’s profits, and hence their stock options, will be enhanced. The second asserts
that firms use stock options to attract employees who are overconfident relative to the market about the
firms’ performance and hence require lower total compensation. The third model contends that stock
options, by increasing the employee’s cost of leaving a firm, improve the firm’s ability to retain employees.
The authors patently reject the incentives-based model; show that any one theory is insufficient to explain
the data; and conclude that a combination of the overconfidence- and retention-based models explains the
data.
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explain the creation of speculative bubbles. Further, an alternative explanation of
speculative bubbles, the feedback theory (in which the success of investors who profit
from speculative price hikes attracts public attention and boosts expectations of further
price increases), may itself be a result of overconfidence (Shiller 2003). Michailova
(2010) provides experimental evidence of overconfidence’s role in speculative bubbles.
A psychological test of overconfidence is used to classify subjects as overconfident or
“rational.” Markets comprising overconfident subjects are more likely to form bubbles,
and their bubbles are significantly larger, than markets with rational subjects.
A rich theoretical and empirical literature also exists that explains trading volume
using overconfidence. To quote De Bondt and Thaler (1995), “the key behavioral factor
needed to understand the trading puzzle is overconfidence. Overconfidence explains why
portfolio managers trade so much....” Barber and Odean (2001) exploit the gendered
nature of overconfidence, particularly in financial markets where men exhibit more
overconfidence than women, to indirectly test whether overconfidence impacts trading
volume. Using data from 35,000 households over six years, they find that men trade
significantly more than women and that trading reduces net returns more for men than
women. Statman et al. (2006) and Kim and Nofsinger (2007) provide empirical evidence
that the feedback theory noted above leads to overtrading and argue that overconfidence
generates the feedback effect. Glaser and Weber (2007) provide direct empirical
evidence. They track four years of trades by individual investors whose overconfidence
has been measured with an online psychological questionnaire and find that
overconfidence significantly increases trading volume.
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There are a number of known precursors of heightened overconfidence. As noted
above, aspects of the decision-environment are known to lead to greater overconfidence.
Overconfidence can be exacerbated when the choice task is difficult, occurs infrequently,
produces noisy feedback, or has abstractly defined goals (Lichtenstein and Fischhoff
1977; Malmendier and Tate 2005). Task repetition and expertise decrease but do not
fully cancel overconfidence (Russo and Schoemaker 1992; Barber and Odean 2007 ).
Evidence on the effect of monetary incentives on overconfidence has been mixed
(Cesarini et al. 2006; Melloy et al. 2006).
Overconfidence has been shown to vary across demographic groups: men
generally have been shown to exhibit more overconfidence than women (Lundeberg et al.
1994; Barber and Odean 2001; Niederle and Vesterlund 2007; Croson and Gneezy 2009);
inhabitants of some Asian countries have been shown to exhibit more overconfidence
than Westerners (Wright et al. 1978; Lee et al. 1995; Yates et al. 1989, 1996, 1997,
1998); and results regarding age are mixed, with some studies finding that
overconfidence increases with age and some that it decreases (Pliske and Mutter 1996;
Crawford and Stankov 1996). An aim of the current research is to determine whether
positive affect is a determinant of overconfidence.

Study 1: The Effect of Positive Affect on Overconfidence
Over time, the themes around which the literature on the effects of positive affect has
been organized have evolved. Early positive-affect research found that positive affect
reduces effortful processing and increases reliance on heuristics and habits; this is
explained by a feelings-as-information theory whereby feeling good signals that one’s
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heuristics are serving her well (Schwarz 1990). However, evidence suggests that these
effects may only hold in low-stakes environments or when information is deemed
unimportant or irrelevant (Isen 2000; Aspinwall 1998). For example, many studies have
shown that positive affect and optimistic beliefs increase the processing of and response
to threatening health information (see Sherman et al. 2000). Other studies find that
positive affect increases willingness to receive negative but useful feedback (Trope and
Neter 1994; Trope and Pomerantz 1998). These studies in which positive affect reduces
defensiveness are of especial interest since they suggest that positive affect improves
information-processing even when that information is self-relevant and threatening.
Lyubomirsky et al. (2005) reviews twenty-seven controlled experiments of the
effect of positive-affect treatment versus neutral-affect or control on dimensions of
creativity and problem solving (e.g., anagram task-performance, problem-solving
accuracy, anchoring bias, creative word associations, number of facts used in judgments,
recall of information in judgments, decision-making efficiency, etc.), twenty of which
support effects in line with improved creativity and problem-solving. The evidence has
led to some recent convergence upon a “happier-and-smarter” theory, namely that
positive affect improves information-processing and cognitive flexibility (Isen 2008). As
explicitly hypothesized by Kuvaas and Kaufmann (2004), this suggests that positive
affect should favor correct assessments and reduce overconfidence.
At the same time, the positive-affect literature also indicates that it increases selfefficacy (Brown and Mankowski 1993; Lyubomirsky et al. 2005; and Schuettler and
Kiviniemi 2006), which is defined as “people's beliefs about their capabilities to produce
designated levels of performance that exercise influence over events that affect their lives
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(Bandura 1994).” Self-efficacy is closely linked to overconfidence, in that
overconfidence can be thought of as undue perceived self-efficacy. 4 While the link
between positive affect and self-efficacy appears to suggest that overconfidence would be
increased by positive affect, upon closer inspection, the valence of the relationship is
unclear. For one, increased self-efficacy may be a justified response to improved
performance (as positive affect has been shown to improve task-performance) or
expected performance, leaving positive affect’s effect on overconfidence ambiguous: if
the effect of positive affect on self-efficacy is less than proportional to its effect on
performance, positive affect could give rise to underconfidence. More fundamentally,
overconfidence is clearly defined by a schism between actual and estimated performance,
whereas self-efficacy is not compulsorily linked to actual performance.
So while there is substantial support for the effect of positive affect on selfefficacy, randomly assigned mood inducement has been used in, to our knowledge, five
psychological experiments to study the effect of affect on the difference between actual
and self-assessed performance. 5 For various reasons, none of these satisfactorily identify
the effect of mild positive affect on overconfidence. Mood-inducement in Allwood and

4

Positive affect is also correlated with heightened self-esteem. The discussion above focuses on selfefficacy because self-esteem is loosely if at all related to overconfidence. It is defined as “the extent to
which one prizes, values, approves, or likes oneself (Blascovich and Tomaka 1991).” One may have low
(high) self-esteem but know that she is an amazing (terrible) soccer player. Similarly, confidence and selfefficacy differ: “the construct of self-efficacy differs from the colloquial term "confidence." Confidence is a
nonspecific term that refers to strength of belief but does not necessarily specify what the certainty is about.
I can be supremely confident that I will fail at an endeavor. Perceived self-efficacy refers to belief in one's
agentive capabilities, that one can produce given levels of attainment. A self-efficacy belief, therefore,
includes both an affirmation of a capability level and the strength of that belief. Confidence is a catchword
rather than a construct embedded in a theoretical system (Bandura 1997)."
5
Meloy et al. (2006) conduct a controlled experiment to study the effect of monetary incentives on
overconfidence with a mediation analysis of mood. They find that monetary incentives increase mood and
overconfidence. However, mood is measured at the very end of the experiment. It is plausible that their
interpretation that incentives boost positive affect which boosts overconfidence can instead be explained as
follows: incentives increase overconfidence, and the combination of overconfidence and higher expected
payments improve mood.
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Bjorhag (1991) is unsuccessful except in the bad-mood treatment, so the effect of positive
affect could not be studied (negative affect has no effect on overconfidence). Allwood et
al. (2002) and Kuvaas and Kaufmann (2004) compare the effect of positive to negative
without a neutral condition. This research can only answer whether good mood has more
or less of an effect on overconfidence than bad mood; both studies find no difference
between the overconfidence of subjects undergoing good- and bad-mood inducement. 6
This is consistent with two very different interpretations: that positive affect and negative
affect have no effect on overconfidence or that they have the same effect. Kuhnen and
Knutson (2011) find exposure to highly arousing scenes of positive (negative) valence
increase (decrease) overconfidence. While they extrapolate from their findings to state
that positive (negative) emotions increase (decrease) overconfidence, it may well be that
their findings are specific to the particular affects they induced (i.e., sexual arousal and
disgust). To wit, all of the other positive-affect experiments discussed in this paper
involve much milder affect-inducement and none are sexual in nature.
Finally, Kramer et al. (1993) study the effect of positive affect on overconfidence
in the context of negotiations, and the researchers are concerned with interacted effects of
induced mood and naturally occurring self-esteem. They find that positive affect
improves performance but does not impact either expected rank or optimism about ownperformance. Further, subjects in the positive-affect treatment are more likely to think
they will achieve their own aspirations and, after negotiations, they are more likely to
believe that they performed well relative to their negotiation partners. This is the closest

6

The effect of negative affect on behavior is complex and depends on the particular negative affect in
question (e.g.. fear versus anger) and is not necessarily the opposite of positive affect (Isen 2007). This is
further addressed in the discussion. We are investigating the effects of negative affect—fear, anger, and
sadness—on overconfidence in other research.
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the extant literature comes to identifying the effect of positive affect on overconfidence.
The effect is only observed on post-negotiation comparisons with others and not on any
self-evaluations, either pre- or post-negotiation, controlling for own-performance.
Further, the validity of ascribing the results to randomly assigned mood-inducement is
questionable. In this paper, mood-inducement is followed by a mood questionnaire, an
overview of the negotiation task, a pre-negotiation questionnaire, the negotiations, and a
post-negotiation questionnaire. Because of the short-lived nature of experimentally
induced mood (Isen and Gorgoglione 1983), it is likely that positive-affect had worn off
by the post-negotiation questionnaire. The results attributed to positive affect may well
be the consequence of improved performance alone.
Circumstantial evidence of a relationship between positive affect and
overconfidence comes from the behavioral finance literature. Specifically, positive affect
has well-documented effects on trading volume and bubbles, both corollaries of
overconfidence identified in the behavioral finance literature, as noted above. The role of
social mood in the formation of bubbles is put forth in Shiller (1984); Redhead (2008)
studies the relationship in the 1990s dot-com bubble. Saunders (1993) and Hirshleifer and
Shumway (2003) show that positive affect arising from unexpected sunshine increases
trading volume; Edmans et al. (2006) shows the same using important and unexpected
sports wins. Lahav and Meer (2010) provide an experimental test of the effect of positive
affect on asset-market bubbles. Experimental asset markets experience significantly
larger bubbles if subjects receive a positive mood-inducement than if they do not.
Andrade et al. (2013) get similar results comparing instead induced excitement to neutralaffect. Combined with these and the Michaelova (2010) findings, our research can help
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identify a potential chain from positive affect to overconfidence to bubbles and
overtrading, although it should be stated that our experiment is not specifically designed
to identify such a chain.

Experimental Design
In brief, our experimental procedure was as follows (additional details are provided
below): First, subjects read detailed instructions regarding the experimental session; the
instructions were also read aloud by the experimenter. Second, subjects read and signed
the informed consent form. Third, subjects took a 30-question quiz. Fourth, the moodinducement procedure was administered. Fifth, subjects evaluated their performance on
the quiz. Sixth, subjects answered questions regarding their mood. Seventh, subjects
answered questions regarding their demographic and psychological characteristics.
Finally, subjects received their certificates of payment and exited the experimental
session. In total, the experimental session lasted approximately 45 minutes, and subjects
received an average of $20 for their participation (all instructions and forms are presented
in Appendix A).

Subjects
The laboratory experiment was conducted at Santa Clara University. One-hundred and
seven undergraduate students (57 male, 50 female) were recruited from courses that all
Santa Clara undergraduate students are required to take. These courses were chosen in an
attempt to ensure that the sample was representative of the entire undergraduate student
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body. Prospective subjects were told that participation in the study would take less than
an hour and that they would be paid for their participation, with an average payment of
$20 and a minimum payment of $5 (the show-up fee).

Quiz (Activity 1)
In the first part of the experiment, called Activity 1, subjects were given 15 minutes to
complete a 30-question quiz. The instructions for Activity 1, which were also read aloud,
stated that subjects would be paid $0.50 for each answer that was exactly correct, and that
no partial credit would be given. The quiz included 20 trivia and 10 math questions. The
trivia questions ranged in difficulty from, “The United States shares the longest
unguarded border in the world with what country?” (correct answer: “Canada”) to, “Who
ruled Iraq before Saddam Hussein?” (correct answer: “Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr”). The
trivia questions closely followed those used by Moore and Small (2007). The math
questions asked subjects to add five two-digit numbers; the two-digit numbers were
generated randomly. The math questions were similar to those used in Niederle and
Vesterlund (2007).

Mood inducement
We attempted to manipulate subjects’ mood by showing them a short film clip. The use
of film clips to induce moods is common in psychological and, increasingly, economic
experiments (Gross and Levenson 1995; Kirchsteiger et al. 2006; Rottenberg et al. 2007;
Ifcher and Zarghamee 2011; and Oswald et al. 2011). Further, the use of film clips has
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been shown to be one of the most effective means of inducing mild positive affect
(Westerman et al. 1996).
In our experiment, half of the subjects (56 of 107) were randomly assigned to the
treatment group and watched a film clip intended to induce positive affect. The other half
of the subjects (51 of 107) were assigned to the control group and watched a film clip
intended to induce neutral affect. Except for the variant film clip, the experimental
procedure was identical for the treatment and control groups.
Our choice of film clips followed Gross and Levenson (1995), in which over 200
film clips were evaluated for their efficacy in inducing each of seven different affects.
The positive-affect film clip was a short montage of stand-up comedy bits from the 2002
“Robin Williams – Live on Broadway.” The neutral-affect film clip was also one
commonly used by psychologists and featured tranquil images of landscapes and wildlife
in Denali National Park, Alaska (for example, Rottenberg et al. 2007). The film clips
were both roughly 8 minutes long.

Performance self-evaluation (Activity 2)
In activity 2 subjects evaluated their performance on the quiz (Activity 1) by answering
the following four questions:
1. “How many of the 30 questions in Activity 1 do you think you answered correctly?”
2. “How well do you think you did in Activity 1?” where possible responses ranged
from 1, “Very poor,” to 7, “Very well”
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3. “I think that I answered _______________ more / fewer (circle one) questions
correctly than did the typical participant in this session.” 7
4. “In terms of correct answers in Activity 1, how do you think you performed relative
to all the other participants in this session?” where possible responses ranged from 1,
“Well below average,” to 7, “Well above average”

Two of the four questions, the first and third, were incentivized financially. The
instructions to Activity 2, which were also read aloud, informed the subjects in detail
about the payment scheme for Activity 2. Specifically, subjects were informed that they
would receive $5 if their answer to question 1 was correct, and $3 ($1) if their answer
was within 3 (6) of the correct answer. The payment scheme for question 3 was similar,
except that subjects had to estimate their relative performance within 2 (4) questions
correctly to receive the $3 ($1) payment, respectively (again Appendix A contains the
instructions for the entire experiment). The instructions for Activity 2 were provided
with Activity 2, itself, so subjects were not instructed when taking the quiz that they
would be assessing their performance.

Affect check (questionnaire 1)
Next subjects completed the Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) to
confirm that the mood-inducement procedure had the intended effect (Watson et al.
1988). Specifically, subjects were asked to rate how much of 7 positive and 9 negative

7

Immediately preceding this question on the form was the following statement: “Activity 1 had 30
questions. Compared to the typical participant in this session, how many more or fewer questions do you
think you answered correctly? (In other words, compare how many of the 30 questions in Activity 1 you
think the typical participant answered correctly to your answer to question #1 above).
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affects they felt during the film clip, where possible responses ranged from 1 (“You do
not feel even the slightest bit of the emotion”) to 10 (“You feel the most of the emotion
you have ever felt in your life”). The seven positive affects are amusement, arousal,
contentment, happiness, interest, relief, and surprise; the nine negative affects are anger,
confusion, contempt, disgust, embarrassment, fear, pain, sadness, and tension. The
PANAS was framed to capture emotions felt during the film clip to avoid any
confounding mood-effects from completing the self-evaluation (Activity 2). Further,
since the primary objective of this research is to examine the impact of mild positive
affect on overconfidence, the self-evaluation (Activity 2) was administered before the
Affect Check. This order of events eliminated the possibility that the induced mood
would be moderated, or nullified, by the Affect Check.
Subjects were also asked whether seeing the film clip made them “Happier,”
“Neither happier, nor sadder,” or “sadder;” and whether the film clip put them in “A
better mood,” “Neither a better, nor a worse mood,” or “A worse mood.” This question
was included in Questionnaire 2 (described below) as a secondary affect check.

Demographic and personality traits (questionnaire 2) and completing the session
Finally, subjects were asked about their demographic and psychological characteristics,
including happiness and personality traits. The measure of happiness comes from the
question, “Taken all together, how would you say things are these days—would you say
that you are…,” where possible responses ranged from 1 (completely unhappy) to 7
(completely happy). This measure is similar to the ones used in the General Social
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Survey and the World Values Survey, each of which has been used extensively in the
happiness-economics literature as a measure of long-term happiness.
When all subjects had completed Questionnaire 2 they received certificates of
payments and exited the experimental session. The certificates included detailed
instructions regarding redeeming the certificate for cash. The certificates also included
the experimenters contact information, and subjects were instructed to contact the
experimenters if they encountered problems redeeming their certificate. Certificates could
be redeemed for cash one hour after the end of the session, and during all subsequent
business hours, at an administrative office on the campus.

Results
Mood Inducement
Total positive affect—the sum of the seven positive affect scores from the PANAS—is
significantly higher for subjects in the treatment than it is for subjects in the control group
(29.80 versus 23.46, p < 0.005). Further, subjects in the treatment group report
significantly higher levels of amusement (6.09 versus 3.32, p < 0.001), happiness (5.50
versus 4.43, p < 0.05), and interest (5.89 versus 4.28, p < 0.001). There is not, however, a
significant difference between subjects in the treatment and control groups for the four
remaining positive affects: arousal, contentment, relief, and surprise. Given that the target
affect for the film clip is amusement, this is not surprising (Gross and Levenson 1995).
Additional evidence that the mood-inducement procedure has the intended effect
can be seen in responses to the following two questions from Questionnaire 2: “Did
seeing the video clip put you in:” “A better mood,” “Neither a better, nor a worse mood,”
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or “A worse mood;” and “Did seeing the video clip make you:” “Happier,” “Neither
happier, nor sadder,” or “Sadder.” The proportion of subjects in the treatment group who
state that the film clip put them in “A better mood” and made them “Happier” is
significantly greater than it is in the control group (0.61 versus 0.27, p < 0.005; and 0.64
versus 0.35, p < 0.005, respectively).
Total negative affect—the sum of the nine negative affect scores from the
PANAS—is not significantly different for subjects in the treatment and control groups
(15.29 versus 14.80, p = 0.773). Interestingly, however, for three of the nine negative
affects subjects in the treatment group report at least marginally significantly higher
scores: anger (1.64 versus 1.24, p < 0.1), disgust (1.88 versus 1.23, p < 0.05), and
embarrassment (1.48 versus 1.04, p < 0.05). We do not believe that these three
differences threaten the validity of the mood-inducement procedure for the following
reasons: First, the average scores for these three negative affects are small in magnitude,
ranging from 1.04 to 1.88. These are quite close to one, the bottom of the response scale
(recall that possible responses ranged from one to ten). Second, the average score for
these three negative affects is substantially smaller than the average score for the three
positive affects that are affected by the mood-inducement procedure (1.41 versus 4.92).
Third, the total negative affect score for subjects in the treatment and control groups is
statistically indistinguishable. Fourth, the source of the increase in anger, disgust, and
embarrassment is clear: there are six subjects (three male, three female) in the treatment
group who exhibit extremely high negative affect. For all negative affects except
confusion, this subgroup of six exhibits significantly higher negative affect than all other
subjects, including those in the control group, making it is easy to control for these
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subjects in the regression analysis. A plausible explanation for this subgroup’s negative
affect is found in the demographic survey, which indicates that the six subjects’ rates of
religious service attendance are all above the pooled median. Further, their median rate
of attendance is at roughly the eightieth percentile of the pooled sample. Presumably,
Robin Williams’ extensive use of foul language in the positive-affect film clip gave rise
to strong negative affect in this subgroup.

Summary Statistics and Tests of Means
Two measures of overconfidence are derived from the responses to questions 1 and 3, the
incentivized questions from Activity 2. In particular, “Absolute Overconfidence” (AOC)
is defined as the difference between the estimated (question 1 from Activity 2) and actual
number of correct answers on the quiz. For example, if a subject estimated that she
answered 20 (14) questions correctly but actually answered 17 correctly, then the
subject’s AOC would be +3 (-3). “Relative Overconfidence” (ROC) is defined as the
difference between a subject’s estimated (question 3 from Activity 2) and actual number
of correct answers on the quiz relative to all subjects in the same session. For example, if
a subject estimated that she answered 4 more (4 fewer) questions correctly than the
average subject in the same session—and she actually answered 2 more questions
correctly than the average in the session—then the her ROC would be +2 (-6).
Subjects exhibit both AOC and ROC: in the pooled sample, average AOC is 2.98
(s.e. = 0.39) and ROC is 1.06 (s.e. = 0.29). Further, overconfidence is diffuse: the
proportion of subjects exhibiting AOC is 0.72 (s.e. = 0.04), which is statistically
significantly higher than half (p-value < 0.001 )and the proportion of subjects exhibiting
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ROC is 0.62 (s.e. = 0.05), which is also statistically significantly greater than half (pvalue < 0.01). Comparing AOC to actual quiz performance (16.87, s.e. = 0.29), we see
that the magnitude of AOC is large: subjects overestimate their own performance by
18.29 percent on average (s.e. = 2.68). Finally, subjects appear to be overconfident
regarding other subjects’ performance as well, as ROC is on average smaller than AOC
(p-value of test of equality < 0.001). That is, if subjects correctly estimated other
subjects’ performance, then ROC should equal AOC.
Preliminary results indicating the direction of the effect of positive affect (PA) on
overconfidence are offered by simple mean-comparisons. First, quiz-performance did not
differ between the treatment and control groups (17.16 versus 16.55, p-value = 0.289).
AOC is insignificantly higher in treatment than control (3.43 versus 2.49, p-value =
0.231), and ROC is marginally significantly higher in treatment than control (1.55 versus
0.51, p-value < 0.10). The magnitude and significance of these differences increase when
the subgroup of six negatively-affected subjects is excluded (AOC: 3.70 versus 2.49, pvalue = 0.135; ROC: 1.89 versus 0.51, p-value < 0.05).
Given the well-established finding that men exhibit greater overconfidence than
women, it is of interest to examine AOC and ROC by gender. While men’s performance
on the 30-item quiz was significantly better than women’s (17.77 versus 15.84, p-value <
0.001) 8, men exhibit significantly greater overconfidence than do women (4.04 versus
1.78, p < 0.005), and a significantly greater proportion of men than exhibit
overconfidence (0.81 versus 0.62, p < 0.05). As measured by ROC, however, there is no

8

On the 20 trivia questions, men significantly outperform women (9.07 versus 6.74, p-value < 0.001).
However, on the ten math questions, performance is not significantly different across gender, with women
insignificantly outperforming men (9.10 versus 8.71, p = 0.124).
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evidence that men exhibit greater overconfidence than do women (1.07 versus 1.04, p =
0.957).
It is also of interest to consider the relationship between accuracy on the quiz and
accuracy of estimated quiz-performance, or quiz-performance and overconfidence. AOC
was insignificantly lower for those with above-average performance on the quiz than
below-average (2.77 versus 3.26, p = 0.536). The ROC of above-average performers,
though, was significantly lower than below-average performers (0.16 versus 2.31, p-value
< 0.001). Indeed, the ROC of above-average performers is statistically indistinguishable
from zero (p-value = 0.662), while that of below-average performers is significant (pvalue < 0.001).
In summary, using simple measures of overconfidence and mean-comparison
tests, there is evidence that positive affect increases ROC, that men exhibit more AOC
than women, and that above-average quiz-performers exhibit less ROC than belowaverage performers. We now turn to a more rigorous analysis.

Main Regression Analysis
To study the effect of mild Positive Affect (PA) on overconfidence, we estimate a model
of the following baseline form:
Estimated Performance = β0+ β1 Treatment + β2 Actual Performance + u
(1)
Treatment is a treatment dummy that equals one if the subject is in the treatment group
(and watched the positive-affect film clip) and zero otherwise. The dependent variable
Estimated Performance is measured by the response to one of the four self-evaluation
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questions. In specifications concerned with absolute overconfidence, it corresponds to
the incentivized responses in which subjects estimated the number of correct answers on
the quiz (Est NC). In these specifications, Actual Performance is given by number of
quiz items the subject actually answered correctly (NC). In specifications concerned with
relative overconfidence, Estimated Performance is measured with the incentivized
responses in which subjects estimated how many more or fewer question they answered
correctly relative to the session-average (Est Rel NC). Actual Performance in these
specifications corresponds to subjects’ actual number of correct answers relative to the
session-average (NC – Session Average). We control for the subset of six negativelyaffected subjects with a dummy variable, though we do not include its coefficient
estimate in the regression tables. Our results are reported for the pooled sample and
separately by gender. All specifications are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS), and robust standard errors are calculated by clustering observations by session. 9
The first three columns of Table I show the coefficient-estimates of equation (1)
with dependent variable Est NC. As shown in Column (1), holding quiz performance
constant, positive affect increases subjects’ estimates of the number of correct answers on
the quiz by a statistically insignificant 1.24 (p-value = 0.153). As we would expect, the
estimated number of correct answers significantly increases with the actual number of
correct answers.
To determine whether positive affect impacts overconfidence differently for men
and women, we re-estimate the specification in Column (1) separately by gender.

9

Because there were a small number of clusters, we performed cluster bootstrap re-estimations of all
specifications of equation (1). In all specifications where there were sufficient observations to compute the
bootstrap standard errors and where at least 50 replicates were complete, results were consistent with those
of Tables I-IV; i.e. estimates of coefficients were identical and significance levels were unaffected.
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Column (2) shows that the effect of the positive-affect treatment on men is positive and
significant, increasing the estimated number of correct answers by 1.86 (p-value < 0.05)
while controlling for actual performance. In contrast, women’s estimated number of
correct answers is virtually unaffected by positive-affect treatment (see Column (3)).
Also, men’s and women’s estimates of performance are impacted quite differently by
actual performance. By comparing the estimates of β0 and β2 across Columns (2) and
(3), we see that men with very low levels of performance are predicted to dramatically
overestimate the number of questions they answered correctly, but that estimated
performance does not increase at pace with actual performance. That is, calibration is
increasing with actual performance for men. Women, on the other hand, are almost
perfectly calibrated at all levels of performance: in Column (3), the estimate of β0 is
statistically indistinguishable from zero (p-value = 0.881) and the estimate of β2 is
statistically indistinguishable from one (p-value = 0.545).
The analysis of the first three columns is repeated in the last three of Table I, but
with dependent variable Est Rel NC measuring Estimated Performance and NC – Session
Average estimating Actual Performance. We see much the same pattern as with absolute
overconfidence, but less marked both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance.
In the pooled sample the effect of positive-treatment is to overestimate performance
relative to the session average by an insignificant 1.20 (p-value = 0.177). However,
gender-subgroup analysis reveals that while the treatment does not impact estimated
relative performance for women, it marginally significantly increases men’s estimated
relative performance by 1.37 (p-value = 0.072), controlling for actual relative
performance.
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In summary, the lack of positive-affect treatment-effect in the pooled samples for
both incentivized measures of overconfidence belies gender-dependent results wherein
men are made more overconfident with treatment and women are unaffected. These
gender-disparate results cannot be explained by differential responses to the moodinducement. Within the treatment group, men’s and women’s reported total positive
affect and amusement are statistically indistinguishable (men: 31.60 versus women:
27.73, p-value = 0.15); the same is true within the control group (men: 24.92 versus
women: 21.65, p-value = 0.26). Further, restricting the sample by gender, the difference
in total positive affect between treatment and control for men (31.60 versus 24.92, pvalue = 0.02) is similar to that for women (27.73 versus 21.65, p-value = 0.03). So while
men and women report similar levels of affect, only men’s estimated number of correct
answers on the quiz is affect-dependent.

Robustness Checks
As further tests of the impact of positive affect on overconfidence, we estimate two
additional sets of specifications. First, we estimate equation (1) substituting the
subjective, unincentivized self-evaluations as dependent variables. While, of course,
these dependent variables are merely self-evaluation and not measures of overconfidence,
they can shed light on overconfidence in regressions controlling for actual performance.
Finally, we estimate equation (1) substituting the total Positive PANAS score for
Treatment. Using this continuous measure allows us to test whether the magnitude of
positive affect is related to the magnitude of overconfidence. As a correlational analysis,
it complements the intent-to-treat analysis and does not rely on successful mood-
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inducement. As such, in the specifications where Positive PANAS is substituted for
Treatment, the subset of six negatively-affected subjects is not controlled for.
Table II shows the estimated coefficients of equation (1)—pooled and by
gender—where the dependent variable is the subjective valuation (1-7) of performance
(Columns (1) – (3)) and performance relative to other session participants (Columns (4) –
(6)). The first three columns show that positive-affect treatment does not have a
significant effect on absolute self-evaluations, neither for men nor women. Comparison
of the estimates of β0 and β2 for men and women shows that men have higher absolute
self-evaluations than do women, but that men’s self-evaluations are less sensitive to
actual performance than are women’s.
Positive-affect treatment increases how well subjects assess their relative
performance by a marginally significant 0.40 on a scale from one to seven (p-value =
0.055). The gender-specific estimations show that this effect is driven by men. Treatment
statistically significantly increases subjective evaluations of relative performance by 0.78
for men (p-value < 0.01), controlling for actual relative performance. For women, the
subjective evaluations of relative performance in treatment and control are statistically
indistinguishable (p-value = 0.647).
Table III shows the estimates of equation (1) using the incentivized questions,
substituting the subject’s sum total of positive PANAS scores (Positive PANAS) for
Treatment. As there are seven positive-affects surveyed on the PANAS, Positive PANAS
has a maximum possible score of 70 (mean = 26.98, s.d. = 10.21). Est NC is the
dependent variable in the first three columns and Est Rel NC in the last three. Controls
for the subsample of six subjects in the positive-affect treatment who experienced high

25

levels of negative affect have been removed. In the pooled samples, both dependent
variables statistically significantly increase with Positive PANAS (see Columns (1) and
(4)). The gender-specific regressions with dependent variable Est NC do not reveal a
gendered response to Positive PANAS. However, we see that men’s estimated
performance is high (β0 = 13.64, p-value < 0.05)) and insensitive to actual performance
(β2 = 0.39, p-value = 0.121). As in Table I, women are well-calibrated, with estimates of
β0 indistinguishable from zero (p-value = 0.973) and β2 indistinguishable from one (pvalue = 0.818). The gender-specific regressions with dependent variable Est Rel NC
reveal that the pooled-sample result is driven by men: controlling for actual relative
performance, estimated relative performance is increasing with self-reported positive
affect for men, but there is no such effect for women.
Table IV shows the estimates of equation (1) using as dependent variables the
unincentivized self-evaluations (on a 1-7 scale) and again substituting Positive PANAS
for Treatment. As with the incentivized measures, in the pooled samples, both absolute
and relative self-evaluations are statistically significantly increasing with Positive PANAS
(see Columns (1) and (4)). The impact of positive affect is in both cases positive and at
least marginally significant for men (see Columns (2) and (5)). As in all specifications,
positive mood does not impact women’s self-evaluations (see Columns (3) and (6).
In general, the robustness checks support the results that both absolute and
relative overconfidence increase with positive affect. There is further support for a
gendered dimension to overconfidence and the impact of positive affect on it. The
robustness checks support that women are better calibrated than men and that their selfevaluations are not dependent on positive-affect. For men, positive affect has a robust
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positive impact on self-evaluations and overconfidence. Because positive affect and
negative affect do not necessarily have opposing effects (Isen 2007), our positive-affect
results does not suggest that negative affect will decrease overconfidence. To consider
the effect of negative affect on overconfidence, we conduct Study 2.

Study 2: The Effects of Anger, Fear, and Sadness on Overconfidence
The effects of negative affect, though equally important, are not as easily organized or
summarized as those of positive affect. The independence of positive and negative affect
is well-established in psychology, so positive and negative affect do not necessarily have
opposite effects (Norman M. Bradburn 1969; Diener and Emmons 1984; Watson et al.
1988; Lyubomirsky et al. 2005; and Isen 2007). Further, distinct negative affects are
likely to have variant effects on behavior so, so the negative-affect literature must be
considered separately by affect; positive affects are less likely to have variant effects
(Isen 2007) 10. Thus one can neither rely on the positive affect literature nor conduct
experiments with generalized negative affect to fully examine the effect of negative
affects on behavior.
The most current theoretical structure for conceptualizing the effect of affects on
behavior and judgment is the appraisal-tendency framework. The theory relies upon each
emotion’s characterization along a range of dimensions—the emotion’s appraisal
tendencies (Smith and Ellsworth 1985; and Lerner and Keltner 2001). The appraisal
10

Much of this is due to the fact that the distinct positive affect that most studies are concerned with is a
happy mood. Also, many studies that consider negative affect elicit only a particular affect—usually
sadness.
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tendencies are pleasantness, certainty, personal responsibility/control, situational
responsibility/control, attention, and anticipated effort. The appraisal tendencies
determine how the emotion alters our perceptions or motives, what information it
conveys, and ultimately how it impacts our behavior. For example, disgust is associated
with unpleasantness, effort, certainty, and another person having control (Smith and
Ellsworth 1985). The theory is supported by experimental evidence that disgust increases
judgments of immorality (Wheatley and Haidt 2005; Inbar et al. 2009) and harshness of
punishments (Schnall et al. 2008). Further, it “revolves around the appraisal theme of
being too close to an indigestible object or idea (Lerner et al. 2004, p. 337), therefore
encouraging expulsion. This is illustrated by experimental results that disgust reduces
status quo bias (Han et al. 2010), increases adjustments from anchors (Inbar and Gilovich
2011), and eliminates the endowment effect (Lerner et al. 2004). Below, we review the
appraisal tendencies of anger, fear, and sadness and the empirical evidence of their
behavioral effects.

Anger
Anger is associated with certainty about the circumstances of a negative situation and
who is to blame for it, and with a sense of personal control over fixing or coping with it
(Lerner and Tiedens 2006). Further, the sense of certainty it imbues is thought to reduce
the motivation to process new information carefully (Inbar and Gilovich 2011).
Controlled experiments have found that it increases risk-seeking (Lerner and Tiedens
2006), stereotyping (Bodenhausen 1994), preferences for in-group members versus outgroup (Mackie et al. 2000; and DeSteno et al. 2004), rejection of unfair ultimatum-game
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offers (Andrade and Ariely 2009), and punishing behavior (Goldberg et al. 1999); and
decreases perceived risk (Johnson and Tversky 1983; Lerner and Keltner 2001), trust
(Dunn and Schweitzer 2005), and preference for public welfare assistance (Small and
Lerner 2005). Because it enhances a sense of personal control and diminishes careful
thought-processing, anger is hypothesized to increase overconfidence.

Fear
Fear, like anger, is a negative emotion, but is anger’s opposite in many dimensions. The
appraisal-tendencies associated with fear are unpleasantness, high uncertainty over
outcomes, and low control over the situation (Smith and Ellsworth 1985). Indeed, in
controlled experiments, induced fear has been shown to increase perceived risk (Johnson
and Tversky 1983; Lerner and Keltner 2001). The appraisal-tendency framework thus
suggests that the reduction of uncertainty and avoidance of risk would be motives
associated with fear (Raghunathan and Pham 1999). Controlled experiments confirm
this: induced fear increases preference for low-risk, low-reward lotteries over high-risk,
high-reward lotteries (Raghunathan and Pham 1999). Uncertainty-reduction and riskavoidance suggest, albeit indirectly, that induced fear may decrease overconfidence.

Sadness
The appraisals associated with sadness are loss, helplessness, and diminished sense of
control over the situation (Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Lerner et al. 2004). Controlled
experiments have found that sadness evokes behavior that rewards both the self and
others: it increases self-eficacy (Jundt and Hinsz 2002); consumption of tasty, fattening
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foods (Garg et al. 2007; valuation of, willingness to pay for, and spending on new
products (Lerner et al. 2004; Cryder et al. 2008); preference for high-risk, high-reward
lotteries over low-risk, low-reward lotteries (Raghunathan and Pham 2005) despite
increased perceived risk (Johnson and Tversky 1983; Lerner and Keltner 2001); helping
behavior (Manucia et al. 1984); and reciprocity in gift-exchange games (Kirchsteiger et
al. 2006).
The above findings are consistent with mood-repair: sad individuals take actions
to improve their affective states (Clark and Isen 1982). Another account relies on the
consistent finding that sadness increases self-focus (Wood et al. 1990; Salovey 1992; and
Silvia et al. 2006). Cryder et al. (2008) demonstrate that the effect of sadness on spending
is mediated by self-focus, and they hypothesize that sadness and self-focus indirectly
“trigger[] an implicit desire to enhance the self (p. 526).”
From these findings, we would expect sadness to increase overconfidence.
Further support for this hypothesis is offered from papers that explicitly study the effect
of sadness on overconfidence. Although Allwood and Bjorhag (1991) find that negative
affect has no effect on overconfidence, Allwood et al. (2002) and Kuvaas and Kaufmann
(2004) compare the effect of positive to negative affect (sadness, specifically) on
overconfidence without a neutral condition and find no difference. This would be
consistent with sadness increasing overconfidence, given that Study 1 finds that positiveaffect increases overconfidence relative to neutral-affect.

Experimental Design
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The experimental procedure followed that of Study1: First, subjects read detailed
instructions regarding the experimental session; the instructions were also read aloud by
the experimenter. Second, subjects read and signed the informed consent form. Third,
subjects took the 30-question quiz. Fourth, the mood-inducement procedure was
administered. Fifth, subjects evaluated their performance on the quiz. Sixth, subjects
answered questions regarding their mood. Seventh, subjects answered questions
regarding their demographic and psychological characteristics. Finally, subjects received
their payments and exited the experimental session. In total, the experimental session
lasted approximately 45 minutes, and subjects received an average of $15 for their
participation (all instructions and forms are presented in Appendix A). The only
procedural deviations from Study 1 were in the subject pool and the film clips utilized to
elicit mood. These are discussed below.

Subjects
The laboratory experiment was conducted at the Center for Experimental Social Science
(CESS) laboratory at New York University. One-hundred and seventy-nine students were
recruited using CESS’s online recruitment tool. Prospective subjects were told that
participation in the study would take less than an hour and that they would be paid for
their participation, with an average payment of between $15 and $20, a minimum
payment of $10, and a maximum payment of $25.

Mood inducement
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Subjects were randomly assigned either to one of three treatment groups—fear (44 out of
179), anger (44 out of 179), and sadness (49 out of 179)—and watched a film clip
intended to induce the appropriate negative affect; or to the control group (42 out of 179)
and watched a film clip intended to induce neutral affect. Except for the variant film clip,
the experimental procedure was identical for the treatment and control groups, and
identical to Study 1.
Our choice of film clips also followed Gross and Levenson (1995). All clips were
roughly 4 minutes long. The film clip in the anger treatment was a scene from My
Bodyguard (Simon, 1980), in which bullies taunt and beat-up a silent, teenage boy. The
film clip in the fear treatment was a scene from Silence of the Lambs (Goetzman, 1991),
in which a female FBI agent pursues a suspect into a dark and eerie basement. The film
clip in the sadness treatment was a scene from The Champ (Lovell, 1979), in which a
boy’s father, a boxer, dies after a match while the boy is watching. The neutral-affect film
clip was a “screensaver”-like animation of colored sticks. It is important to note that this
was different from the neutral-affect film clip in Study 1. The elicitation of neutral affect
can err on the side of either pleasantness or boredom (Rottenberg et al. 2007). To avoid
type I errors, the relatively pleasant Denali clip served as the control against the positiveaffect treatment in Study 1, while the more tedious “sticks” clip served as a control
against negative affects in Study 2; both clips were drawn directly from Rottenberg et al.
(2007).
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Results
Sample
In addition to coming from a different university, the subjects in this study are
demographically different from those in Study 1 in other ways: over half of the subjects
are female (64 percent); over half of the subjects are Asian (56 percent), with white as the
next biggest ethnic group (29 percent); and a substantial minority are not U.S. citizens
(21 percent). We will explore the extent to which results vary for Asians versus nonAsians.

Mood Inducement
Subjects in each treatment group report significantly higher levels of the target affect than
subjects in the control group: 5.19 versus 2.56, p-value < 0.001, for anger; 4.48 versus
1.98, p-value < 0.001, for fear; and 5.18 versus 1.80, p-value < 0.01, for sadness (see
Table 2). Further evidence that the mood-inducement procedure has the intended effect
can be seen in responses to the following questions from Questionnaire 2: “Did seeing the
video clip make you?” (1) “angrier,” (2) “more fearful,” or (3) “sadder.” The proportion
of subjects in each treatment group who state that the film clip changes their mood as
intended is significantly greater than it is in the control group: 0.46 versus 0.12, p-value <
0.01, for angrier; 0.36 versus 0.10, p-value < 0.01, for more fearful; and 0.63 versus 0.10,
p-value < 0.01, for sadder (see Table 2). Finally, total negative affect—the sum of the
nine negative affect scores from the PANAS—is at least marginally significantly greater
for subjects in each treatment group than it is for subjects in the control group: 37.63
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versus 22.22, p < 0.001, for anger; 27.60 versus 22.22, p < 0.10, for fear; and 31.53
versus 22.22, p < 0.01 for sadness.
Total positive affect—the sum of the seven positive affect scores from the
PANAS—is marginally lower for subjects in anger and sadness treatments than for
subjects in the control group: 16.91 versus 20.54, p < 0.10, for anger; and 16.87 versus
20.54, p < 0.10, for sadness. Interestingly, however, total positive affect is greater, but
not significantly so, for subjects in the fear treatment than for subjects in the control
group: 22.21 versus 20.54, p-value = 0.456. This difference arises because the fear
treatment’s film clip increases interest scores compared to the neutral-affect film clip:
6.09 versus 4.05, p < 0.01; neither of the other negative-affect film clips has this impact.
As a matter of fact, all other positive-affect scores for subjects in the three treatment
groups are weakly less than the scores for subjects in the control group. Thus, the
negative-affect film clips do not increase positive-affect scores in general. Finally,
subjects in the fear treatment report that they enjoy watching the film clip significantly
more than subjects in the control group: 4.68 versus 3.54 (p < 0.01). Again, neither of the
other negative-affect film clips has this impact. 11 In the econometric analysis, we control
for the eight subjects in the fear-treatment who had unusually high enjoyment of the clip
and levels of interest. Specifically, these subjects are identified by having reported both
of the following: (i) enjoyment of the clip of greater than or equal to 6 out of 7 (there
were 15 such subjects out of the total 179 subjects in the whole experiment) and (ii)
interest greater than or equal to 7 out of 10 (there were 45 such subjects out of the total

11

We believe these two unanticipated effects—elevated interest scores and greater enjoyment—stem from
the fact that Silence of the Lambs is a well-known film that many subjects may have already seen featuring
a contemporary celebrity many subjects are familiar with. The other negative-affect film clips are less
well-known.
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179 subjects in the whole experiment). Only eight subjects, all in the fear treatment,
satisfied both criteria, and our econometric analysis includes an indicator variable that
takes a value of one for these eight subjects and zero otherwise.
Finally, each negative-affect film clip significantly (p < 0.01) increases untargeted
negative-affect scores. The anger treatment’s film clip significantly increases contempt,
disgust, embarrassment, sadness, and tension scores; the fear treatment’s film clip
increases disgust, and tension scores; and the sadness treatment’s film clip increases
disgust, fear, pain, and sadness scores. Further, the proportion of subjects in the anger
treatment who state that the film clip made them sadder is significantly greater than it is
in the control group: 0.57 versus 0.10, p < 0.01. Thus, we were not able to induce the
three negative affects—anger, fear, and sadness—without “spillover” to other negative
affects, so this should be kept in mind when interpreting the results.

Summary Statistics and Tests of Means
As in Study 1, subjects exhibit both AOC and ROC: in the pooled sample, average AOC
is 1.57 (s.e. = 0.29) and ROC is 0.85 (s.e. = 0.25). Comparing pooled samples, the level
of AOC is statistically significantly in Study 2 than in Study 1 (1.56 versus 2.98, p-value
< 0.005); this is also reflected with marginal statistical significance in a comparison of
the AOC of the control groups (0.81 in Study 2 versus 2.49 in Study 1, p-value = 0.06).
The proportion of subjects exhibiting AOC is 0.63 (s.e. = 0.04), which is statistically
significantly more than half (p-value < 0.001) and statistically indistinguishable from the
corresponding proportion in Study 1, 0.72 (p-value = 0.13). The proportion of subjects
exhibiting ROC is also 0.63 (s.e. = 0.04), which is statistically significantly more than
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half (p-value < 0.001) and statistically indistinguishable from the corresponding
proportion in Study 1, 0.62 (p-value = 0.99).
Subjects got an average of 18.35 (s.e. = 0.23) items correct on the quiz, which is
statistically significantly higher than the average of 16.87 in Study 1 (p-value < 0.001).
Thus subjects overestimate their quiz performance by 9.2 percent on average (s.e. =
1.84), significantly lower than the comparable figure of 18.29 percent in Study 1 (p-value
< 0.005). As in Study 1, subjects appear to be overconfident regarding other subjects’
performance as well, as ROC is on average smaller than AOC (p-value of the test of
equality <0.01).
We will now turn to simple mean-comparisons for preliminary results of the
effects of anger, fear, and sadness on overconfidence. First, quiz-performance did not
differ between the control (17.98) and treatment groups (anger: 17.89, p-value of test of
equality with control = 0.901; fear: 18.87, p-value = 0.31; sadness: 18.78, p-value =
0.227). AOC is statistically insignificantly lower in control (0.81) than in any of the
treatment groups (anger: 1.61, p-value = 0.409; fear: 1.98, p-value = 0.190; sadness: 1.82,
p-value = 0.210). Similarly, ROC is statistically insignificantly lower in control (0.55)
than in any of the treatment groups (anger: 0.74, p-value = 0.811; fear: 1.30, p-value =
0.346; sadness: 0.81, p-value = 0.714). Excluding the eight positively-affected subjects
in the fear treatment increases the magnitude and significance of these differences (AOC:
2.39 versus 0.81, p-value < 0.10; ROC: 1.54 versus 0.55, p-value = 0.241).
For comparability to Study 1, we examine AOC and ROC by gender. While
men’s performance on the 30-item quiz was significantly better than women’s (19.60

36

versus 17.64, p-value < 0.001) 12, men exhibit marginally significantly greater
overconfidence than do women (2.29 versus 1.16, p < 0.10), although the proportions of
men and women exhibiting overconfidence is statistically indistinguishable (0.67 versus
0.61, p < 0.342). In Study 1, the gender difference in AOC was greater both in magnitude
and statistical significance, and the proportion of men exhibiting AOC was statistically
significantly greater than the proportion of women. As in Study 1, men’s and women’s
ROC are statistically indistinguishable (0.86 versus 0.84, p = 0.961).
Given the large proportion of Asians in the sample, we examine AOC and ROC
by Asian self-identification. While Asians have statistically insignificantly lower quiz
performance than non-Asians (18.05 versus 18.78, p-value = 0.121) 13, they exhibit
significantly lower levels of AOC (0.91 versus 2.36, p-value < 0.05) and a significantly
smaller proportion exhibits AOC (0.54 versus 0.74, p-value < 0.01). Asians and nonAsians do not significantly differ in ROC (0.83 versus 0.94, p –value = 0.822).
Turning to the relationship between quiz-performance and overconfidence, we
find that AOC was insignificantly higher for those with above-average performance on
the quiz than below-average (1.69 versus 1.44, p = 0.671), which is the reverse of what
was found in Study 1. As in Study 1, the ROC of above-average performers was
significantly lower than below-average performers (0.04 versus 1.72, p-value < 0.001).
Indeed, as in Study 1, the ROC of above-average performers is statistically

12

On the 20 trivia questions, men significantly outperform women (10.60 versus 8.50, p-value < 0.001).
However, on the ten math questions, performance is not significantly different across gender, with women
insignificantly outperforming men (9.14 versus 9.00, p = 0.512).
13
On the 20 trivia questions, non-Asians significantly outperform Asians (10.12 versus 8.60, p-value <
0.001). However, on the ten math questions, non-Asians perform significantly lower than Asians (8.66
versus 9.45, p = 0.512).
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indistinguishable from zero (p-value = 0.896), while that of below-average performers is
significant (p-value < 0.001).
In summary, using simple measures of overconfidence and mean-comparison
tests, there is no evidence that any of the negative affects impacts either of the measures
of overconfidence. We do find overconfidence-differences between men and women,
between Asians and non-Asians, and between above- and below-average performers. As
in Study 1, these demographic differences will guide our subgroup regression analysis.

Main Regression Analysis
To study the effect of fear, anger, and sadness on overconfidence, we estimate a model of
the following baseline form:
Estimated Performance = β0+ β1 Anger Treatment + β2 Fear Treatment + β3 Sadness
Treatment + β4 Actual Performance + u

(2)

All variables are defined as in equation (1), with the dummy variables Anger Treatment,
Fear Treatment, and Sadness Treatment equal to one if the subject is in the
corresponding treatment group (and watched the corresponding affect’s film clip) and
zero otherwise. As in Study 1, all specifications are estimated with Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS), and robust standard errors are calculated by clustering observations by
session.
Table V show the coefficient-estimates of equation (2) with dependent variable
Est NC. As shown in Column (1), holding quiz performance constant, anger increases
subjects’ estimates of the number of correct answers on the quiz by a statistically
insignificant 0.80 (p-value = 0.593), fear increases estimates by a marginally significant
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1.65 (p-value < 0.10), and sadness increases estimates by a statistically insignificant 1.07
(p-value = 0.203). As we would expect, the estimated number of correct answers
significantly increases with the actual number of correct answers.
Next we attempt to determine whether negative affect impacts estimated quiz
performance differently by demographic subgroup. We re-estimate the specification in
Column (1) separately for men and women in Columns (2) and (3), respectively. For
neither gender does any of the negative-affect treatments have a statistically significant
impact on estimated quiz-performance. In Columns (4) and (5), we re-estimate the
Column (1) specification separately for non-Asians and Asians, respectively. The angerand fear-treatments have no statistically significant impact on estimates for either Asians
or non-Asians. Sadness, though, statistically significantly increases estimates of quizperformance by 2.71 for non-Asians (p-value < 0.05), with no statistically significant
effect for Asians (p-value = 0.402). Coefficient estimates of the effects of the negative
affects on estimated quiz performance, while mostly insignificant, are all positive with
the exception of the anger-treatment for the women-only specification.
The analysis of Table V is repeated in Table VI, but with dependent variable Est
Rel NC measuring Estimated Performance and NC – Session Average estimating Actual
Performance. All treatment-coefficients are statistically insignificant, with the exception
of one: for non-Asians, the sadness treatment reduces subjects’ estimate of their
performance relative to others by 0.86 (p-value < 0.10). All fear-treatment coefficients
are positive, while anger and sadness coefficients are negative in the men-only and nonAsian-only specifications.
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Within the sadness-treatment group, non-Asian’s reported higher levels of each of
the negative affects than did Asians, statistically significantly so for fear (3.86 versus
2.60, p-value < 0.05 and marginally statistically significantly so for the sum of all
negative PANAS items (36.57 versus 29.51, p-value = 0.063). Sadness itself was
insignificantly higher for non-Asians than Asians (6.07 versus 4.83, p-value = 0.131);
and the sum of all positive PANAS items was statistically indistinguishable for nonAsians and Asians (17.29 versus 16.70, p-value = 0.818). Further, in the control group,
non-Asians reported lower levels of all negative affects than did Asians; the difference
was marginally statistically significant for contempt, disgust, and embarrassment, and
statistically significant for sadness (1.07 versus 2.35, p-value < 0.05), anger (1.33 versus
3.42, p-value < 0.05), confusion (3.33 versus 5.50, p-value < 0.005), pain (1.27 versus
2.91, p-value < 0.05), and the sum of all negative PANAS items (27.70 versus 14.87, pvalue < 0.05). Further, restricting the sample by Asian self-identification, we find that
both non-Asians and Asians have increased sadness in the sadness-treatment compared to
control, though the difference is much larger for Asians (non-Asians: 6.07 versus 1.07, pvalue <0.001; Asians: 4.83 versus 2.35, p-value < 0.001). For non-Asians, the sum of all
negative PANAS items is higher in the sadness-treatment compared to control (36.57
versus 14.87, p-value < 0.001), but for Asians the sum of all negative PANAS items is
statistically indistinguishable between the sadness treatment and control (29.51 versus
27.70, p-value =0.647). Thus, the disparity between the effect of the sadness-treatment
on overconfidence for non-Asians’ and Asians’ may be attributable to differential
responsiveness to mood inducement. Note, this differs from the gender-differences in the
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effect of positive affect on overconfidence, as those were not attributable to differential
responsiveness to mood inducement.

Robustness Checks
When repeating Tables V and VI but with the unincentivized self-evaluations as
dependent variables, all treatment coefficients in all specifications are statistically
insignificant (see Tables VII and VIII). Interestingly, when repeating Tables V-VII but
with the PANAS scores as regressors instead of the treatments and removing the control
for the eight subjects in the fear treatment with high enjoyment and interest, the sign of
the corresponding PANAS items flips. That is, while the anger-, fear-, and sadnesstreatments tend to be positively associated with overconfidence, the levels of selfreported anger, fear, and sadness are often negatively correlated with overconfidence.
Given the confounding of affects induced by the negative-affect treatments and the
disparate mood-inducement of non-Asians and the Asian majority, attributing any
correlations between the treatments and control to the mood being induced is difficult.

General Discussion
To identify the effect of affect on overconfidence, we conduct two random-assignment
experiments in which subjects evaluate their performance on a quiz after experiencing
either an affective or neutral shock. Prior literature supports hypotheses in either
direction for the effect of positive affect on overconfidence in Study 1; in Study 2, we
hypothesized that anger, fear, and sadness would have positive, negative, and positive
effects on overconfidence, respectively. The results from Study 1 consistently indicate
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that positive affect induces overconfidence in men but not women. Study 2 found very
little consistent support for any effect of the negative affects on overconfidence; this
could be attributable to the ethnically non-standard sample, the arousal of interest and
enjoyment by some of the clips intended to induce negative affect, or, of course, a truly
negligible and/or inconsistent effect of these negative affects on overconfidence.
To determine the magnitude of the effect of positive affect on overconfidence, we
control for the actual number of correct responses and find that the positive-affect shock
increases male subjects’ estimated number of correct responses by 1.86, an 8.9% increase
in estimated performance relative to the male, control-group mean. The magnitude of the
increase in relative overconfidence is even more dramatic: controlling for actual
performance relative to session participants, the positive-affect shock increases male
subjects’ estimated relative performance by 1.37, an 86.7% increase in estimated
performance relative to the male, control-group mean. The financial consequences of
these increases in overconfidence are sizable. While not statistically significant,
payments corresponding to the incentivized absolute (relative) overconfidence questions
were 6.5% (13.8%) lower for subjects in the positive-affect treatment relative to control.
Overconfidence is a problem of beliefs, and beliefs are a precursor to observable
behavior. As noted in the introduction, overconfidence may explain the effect of positive
affect on trading volume and the persistence of speculative bubbles. Further, the effect of
positive affect on overconfidence also has implications for how we interpret other
existing research on the effect of positive affect on human behavior. For example,
positive affect may decrease time preference by making us more overconfident of our
ability to be patient or stave off future self-control problems.
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As expounded in Ifcher and Zarghamee (2011), it is important to provide
guidance on what can be extrapolated from research investigating the impact of mood on
behavior. First, the behavioral effects of intense mood-states are not necessarily
amplifications of the effects of mild ones, so intense positive affect will not necessarily
dramatically increase overconfidence (Isen 2007). Finally, since it has been claimed by
psychologists that, “frequent positive affect is both necessary and sufficient to produce
the state we call happiness, whereas intense positive experience is not (Diener et al.
1991),” our result suggests that happier individuals may exhibit more overconfidence.
Our result also has implication for the interpretation of neural evidence. Knutson
et al. (2008) study neural correlates of risk-taking after mood-inducement. In an all-male
laboratory experiment where mood was induced with erotic images, they find that the
ensuing activation in the nucleus accumbens—a region that processes rewards, motivates
approach of rewarding cues, and is associated with excitement—is associated with a
higher likelihood of making risky investments. In later work, Kuhnen and Knutson
(2011) find that positive mood-inducement using erotic images leads increased risktaking and negative mood-inducement using images like rotting food reduce risk-taking.
It is assumed, but not explicitly shown in the research, that activation of the nucleus
accumbens drives the positive-affect effect and activation of the anterior insula—a region
linked to processing losses and punishment and the avoidance of aversive stumuli—
drives the negative-affect effect. It should be noted that these neural correlate may not be
relevant to our experiment since, in Study 1, we elicit a milder positive affect
(amusement) and not arousal, and in Study 2, we do not attempt to induce on disgust.
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Kuhnen and Knutson (2011) also find that the subjects who saw erotic images
updated beliefs about financial investments in a way so as to maintain a positive mood, a
finding that supports positive-mood-maintenance as a byproduct of positive affect. This
means that positive affect can increase overconfidence if positive self-assessment helps
maintain positive affect; in contrast, positive affect can promote accuracy if accuracy
helps maintain positive affect. Our results support the former: that positive selfassessment helps maintain positive affect.
The neuropsychological literature on overconfidence suggests that it can be
understood as heuristic processing that can be corrected with cognitive control (Beer and
Hughes 2011). Specifically, it has been shown that the accuracy of self-evaluations—
both of one’s own performance and in relation to others—is associated with activity in
the orbitofrontal cortex and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, with the magnitude of
activity positively proportional to the magnitude of overconfidence (Beer and Hughes
2011). These same neural regions have also been associated with overcoming
susceptibility to incidental yet salient characteristics like emotions and framing in
gambling judgments (Beer and Hughes 2011). The medial prefrontal cortex, on the other
hand, has been implicated in exaggerating overconfidence (Beer and Hughes 2011).
Ashby et al. (1999) theorize that the effect of positive affect on behavior is
associated with dopamine, the neurotransmitter released after the presentation of
rewarding stimuli. Dopamine agonists elevate mood, while dopamine antagonists flatten
affect (see Ashby et al. 1999). Of specific relevance to our research, the researchers posit
that positive affect is associated with dopamine release from the ventral tegmental area
to, among other areas, the anterior cingulate. Dopamine in the anterior cingulate
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facilitates the selection of cognitive perspective. One of the many cognitive-flexibility
tasks with which this has been illustrated, namely word fluency, has also been shown to
be performed better under positive-affect inducement (see Ashby et al. 1999). There is
also evidence that the anterior cingulate is involved in affective processes including
conditioned emotional learning and the assignment of emotional valence to stimuli (see
Ashby et al. 1999). If positive affect increases cognitive flexibility by facilitating the
selection of cognitive perspective, we would expect behavior to be modified to one’s
benefit. In utility-maximization terms, facilitated selection of cognitive perspective can
be thought of as relaxing a cognitive constraint. The implications of cognitive flexibility
for overconfidence are ex ante ambiguous. As noted above, Kuvaas and Kaufman (2004)
predict that the cognitive flexibility positive affect affords should increase accuracy (and
thereby decrease overconfidence). It may be, though, that idiosyncratic preferences favor
self-enhancement to accuracy, in which case improved cognitive flexibility would
increase overconfidence. Again, the results of Study 1 support this latter interpretation.
In summary, the positive-affect result adds an important dimension to the
emerging picture of positive affect’s impact on human behavior. It has been posited that
positive affect increases cognitive flexibility by broadening focus and attention,
promoting openness to information, and enabling improved integration of information
(Ashby et al. 1999; Isen 2008). This suggests that positive affect should decrease
overconfidence. That positive affect increases overconfidence and hence exacerbates
mistaken belief-formation and reduces earnings suggests that improved cognitive
flexibility is not always positive affect’s primary effect. Individuals may look to selfenhancement as a means of maintaining a positive mood or may fall back on it at the
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heuristic level. While our findings suggest that positive affect exacerbates
overconfidence, we find no effect of negative affects on overconfidence. Further
research is necessary to determine whether this lack of result reflects a true absence of a
relationship or failed mood inducement.
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Table I: Estimating treatment effect, incentivized self-evaluations as dependent variables
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Table II: Estimating treatment effect, unincentivized self-evaluations as dependent variables
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Table III: Estimating effect of positive PANAS scores, incentivized self-evaluations as dependent variables

Table IV: Estimating effect of positive PANAS scores, unincentivized self-evaluations as dependent variables
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Table V: Estimating treatment effects, incentivized self-evaluation of performance as dependent variable
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Table VI: Estimating treatment effects, incentivized self-evaluation of performance relative to others as dependent variable
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Table VII: Estimating treatment effects, unincentivized self-evaluation of performance as dependent variable
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Table VIII: Estimating treatment effects, unincentivized self-evaluation of performance relative to others as dependent variable
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Table IX: Estimating effects on PANAS items, incentivized self-evaluation of performance as dependent variable
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Table X: Estimating effects on PANAS items, incentivized self-evaluation of performance relative to others as dependent variable
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Table XI: Estimating effects on PANAS items, unincentivized self-evaluation of performance as dependent variable
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Table XII: Estimating effects of PANAS items, unincentivized self-evaluation of performance relative to others as dependent variable
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